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M edicine and law emerged in the early decades of the twentieth
century as strong, highly organized professions with high status,
increasing rewards, and growing autonomy.' Professional claims of
esoteric knowledge, collegial solidarity, and disinterestedness were ac-
cepted by members of the profession and the general public. Professional
schools in both disciplines forged university connections and achieved
dominant positions in the preparation of new professionals. Patterns of
medical and legal education established during this formative period,
extending roughly from 1890 to 1920, have been highly persistent. Since
then, the organization and activities of doctors and lawyers have changed
markedly under the impact of increased specialization, growing bureau-
cratization, and expanded competition. Each profession is haunted by
fears that fragmentation, commercialism, and excessive competition will
undermine traditional professional values such as autonomy.
Despite these similarities, educators in the two professions have
proceeded in isolation from one another. There has been little knowledge
* Roger C. Cramton is Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University. This
paper was prepared for a symposium on the economics of medical education at Vanderbilt
University in May 1985. A slightly different version of this paper, prepared for a medical
audience, has been published in the Fall 1986 issue of Health Affairs.
' Developments in medicine and medical education are discussed in P. STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); those in law and legal education in R.
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1950s (1983).
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or consideration by those in one profession of developments in the other.
Little effort has been made to compare the two fields of professional
education and to ask whether each could learn from the experience of the
other. This paper is a preliminary exploration of this subject. It begins
with an overview of persistent differences in medical and legal education,
examines and attempts to explain some common failings, and concludes
with some tentative comments on what each sphere of professional
education might learn from the other. The focus in each case will be on
preparation leading to the basic professional degree (M.D. in the case of
medicine and J.D. in the case of law), rather than subsequent graduate or
specialized education.
I. SOME PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES
Beneath the common ground of professional ideology, there are impor-
tant differences between medicine and law. Health is a more important
social value in contemporary America than justice, and there is much
greater agreement on its content. Despite inequalities in the distribution
of health care, doctors serve a larger range of the population-rich and
poor-than lawyers, who primarily are employed by the well-to-do.
Whatever the force of the argument in medicine that the supply of
physicians creates its own demand,2 this argument has much greater
plausibility in law because of the premises and effects of the adversary
system. Legal exertions on behalf of one person have interactive and
dynamic effects: they create legal costs for others, who must hire lawyers
and defend proceedings, and social costs for the public. Imagine the
effects on health care if one group of doctors were trying to make the
patient well and another group were trying to keep him ill.
These differences explain a crucial variable-the willingness of the
public to devote public funds to health care and to medical education.
Unlike legal education, medical education need not support itself on
tuition and philanthropy alone. Although the indirect support of medical
education built into federal health-care programs is now threatened, the
current problem of medical educators is how to present their arguments
to taxpayer representatives so that public subsidies will be renewed and
expanded. That option is not open to legal educators.
Apart from these global differences, medical and legal education differ
in structure and form. Three important structural differences that have
persisted over a long period of time are worth mentioning: (1) scale of
2 Arguments of a supply-induced demand usually rest on an ability of suppliers to dupe
consumers (e.g., performance of unnecessary medical services for an uninformed patient)
and do not, strictly speaking, include the greater use that flows from the greater
accessibility of suppliers. My comparison here is concerned with neither of these, but
instead with the interactive effects of the use of lawyers in an adversary system.
[Vol. 34:349
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss3/3
1986] PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN MEDICINE AND LAW 351
resources; (2) emphasis on clinical education; and (3) specialization and
apprenticeship patterns.3
Although the dimensions of legal and medical education are fairly
similar in some respects (such as the number of schools and number of
students),4 the resources devoted to medical education dwarf those
devoted to legal education.5 The average cost of law study per student per
year in the United States is about $7,000 today; the comparable figure for
medical education is harder to pin down because of joint-cost problems,
but is probably five to seven times as large ($30,000-$50,000 per year,
excluding patient care and research costs).6 There are approximately ten
times as many medical faculty as there are law faculty, including clinical
faculty in both cases.7 The typical student-faculty ratio in medical
education is 3:1 (including graduate medical education as well as the
M.D. program), while in legal education it is closer to 25:1.8 A typical
medical college's budget will be at least ten times as large as that of the
law school at the same university. Moreover, the range in resources
within the law school world is larger than in medicine: law school budgets
at the best funded schools are twenty times as large as the budgets at the
worst funded, a much larger range than in medicine.
These vast differences in scale have many implications. Law schools
' A fourth difference is too obvious to dwell upon: the J.D. program for lawyers requires
three academic years while the M.D. program for doctors takes four academic years.
' There are 127 nationally accredited medical schools in the United States and 173
nationally accredited law schools producing over 16,000 M.D. graduates each year and over
twice that many law graduates. For most of the past one hundred years, there were more
doctors than lawyers in the United States, but the more rapid growth of the legal profession
since 1975 (when each profession numbered about 410,000) has resulted in about 1.2
lawyers for each doctor.
I The statistics on medical education in this paper are drawn from the Annual Reports
of the Association of American Medical Colleges (Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as
AAMC Ann. Rep.]; Association of Medical Colleges, Medical Education: A Background
Paper (May, 1981) [hereinafter cited as AAMD Background Paper]; and Swanson, Medical
Education in the United States and Canada, J. MED. EDUC. Nov. 1984, at 35. The statistics
on legal education are drawn from the American Bar Association publication of the Section
of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, A Review of Legal Education in the United
States, Fall 1983 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA Ann. Rev. Fall 1983]; C. AUERBACH,
HSTORICAL STATISriCS OF LEGAL EDUCATION (1985).
' The law school figure comes from conversations with James P. White, Consultant on
Legal Education, American Bar Association; White derives it from confidential figures
supplied to his office by each law school. The medical figure is an estimate based on the
informed guess of insiders that about one-half of the non-research expenditures of medical
colleges is devoted to undergraduate medical education.
' In 1982-83 there were 54,972 fulltime medical faculty, about three-fourths of them
clinicians, according to AAMC Ann. Rep. 1983-84; ABA Ann. Rev. Fall 1983 reports 4,451
fulltime law faculty in the same year.
s These averages conceal substantial variations. Faculty-student ratios at the largest
medical research centers are closer to 1:1. They are considerably less favorable at those
medical schools that are not significant research centers.
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are largely dependent on tuition, which provides over eighty-five percent
of their support as compared to about five percent in the case of medical
schools. This has made law schools more oriented to the consumers of
legal education, more interested in teaching, and lower in cost. Con-
versely, private medical schools now receive more than one-third of their
income from faculty practice plans; it is not surprising that they are
oriented more to patient care than are law schools to client care. Law
schools receive virtually no income from the provision of client services.
Law schools have played a larger role than medical schools in raising
the sons (and a few daughters) of immigrants to middle-class life; relative
to other professions, law has been marked by open access. The downside
vices accompanying the law's democratic virtue are mass-production
classroom methods, evaluation exclusively by written final examination,
very little clinical education, and limited social research by law faculty.
The differences in scale also affect the organization and incentives of
the two professional schools. Law faculty meet in a single group, varying
in size from fifteen to eighty at different schools; they are not organized
in departments. Teaching takes much of their time and is probably the
most important priority of most faculties in terms of peer attitudes and
institutional rewards. Although law faculty are expected to do research,
especially at the better university law schools, and there is some
supplementation of income through outside consulting, teaching is a
more central activity than with medical faculty, for whom research and
patient care are larger commitments.
A second difference, related to the first, is the much greater emphasis
placed on clinical education in medical schools. At least fifty percent of
medical instruction is clinical education, a figure light years beyond the
miniscule credit hours that law students are permitted, but not generally
required, to devote to clinical experience. Although the proportion of
clinical instruction at American law schools is highly variable-ranging
from none at some law schools to perhaps as high as fifteen percent at a
few-most law schools devote substantially less than ten percent of
student credit hours to clinical education.
The patterns of student morale in medicine and law are related to
differences in the timing and extent of clinical experience. Medical
students are bored by the initial years of basic science and excited by the
clinical years. The pattern in legal education is the reverse; high
enthusiasm in the first year declining in the two upperclass years. Why
this contrast? Medical school provides lecture, drill, and memorization in
its initial phases. Rightly or wrongly, many medical students view this
passive learning in large lecture halls as an obstacle they must overcome
before getting to the real thing-the patient contact and practical
application of the clinical rotations in the teaching hospital.
Law school, on the other hand, starts with problem-solving activity
that is tough but exciting-the analysis and argumentative use of legal
materials. In an important sense, this is a clinical method that forces
[Vol. 34:349
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students to play lawyer roles and solve legal problems. But repetitious
use of the same technique, lack of progression in the curriculum, and the
failure to move deeply into either practical application or theoretical
underpinnings has adverse effects on student motivation and morale.
Law school, partly because of adverse student-faculty ratios, has diffi-
culty building a sense of colleagueship between teacher and student. The
absence of an analog to the teaching hospital makes it difficult to
organize and provide high-quality clinical experience to law students.
The third persistent structural difference is the formality, length, and
universality in medicine of the process by which specialized practitioners
are produced. Specialization is the name of the game in both medicine
and law, but it is organized and regulated in medicine to a degree that is
unknown in law. The extent and pervasiveness of specialization in
medicine is probably greater than in law, with the vast majority of
physicians today considering themselves a member of a specialty or
subspecialty. Primary care is itself becoming a field of specialization,
with family practice and emergency care as two subfields. Although most
lawyers concentrate their practice in a few areas, the extent and degree
of specialism is less than in medicine.
More importantly, in law today, there are almost no formal programs
of specialism: no systematic apprenticeship requirements either as part of
advanced education or early practice; no national certification of special-
ists (and very limited experimentation with state certification); and no
restriction of practice to specialists through hospital-staff controls or
referral arrangements. Some law graduates get excellent apprenticeship
experiences during the first years of legal employment; others are left to
trial and error in the school of hard knocks-learning from their
adversaries at the expense of their clients.
II. SOME COMMON FAILINGS
Despite these structural differences, the common elements of medical
and legal education, especially their common failings, are worthy of
attention. Each form of professional training has persistent problems,
similar in nature, that have resisted the exhortations of reformers for
more than fifty years. Perhaps these problems derive from the underlying
tension in professional education between graduate education-valuing
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake-and learning a trade, with
aspects of rote learning and practical application that cannot always be
intellectually interesting.
A. Neglect of Self-Learning and Intellectual Curiosity
First, self-learning and intellectual curiosity are not sufficiently fos-
tered, despite their critical importance in the maintenance of professional
competence over a long period of practice in a rapidly changing society.
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The deadening effect of medical school comes from passive learning in
large lectures, the glorification of facts in both teaching and examina-
tions, and the emphasis in the clinic on routine tasks, test, and proce-
dures-all to the detriment of critical thinking in professional problem-
solving. Writers on medical education consistently lament that so few
medical students, in their quest to memorize the facts required for the
national boards, comprehend the underlying beauty and power of scien-
tific inquiry and method in medicine. 9
In law school also, the narrowing effects come from the method and
content of the curriculum. The casebook imprisons the student, who
rarely looks elsewhere and uses the library largely as a study hall. The
daily march in most classes through fifteen to twenty-five pages of cases
is stultifying enough, but it also communicates messages about what is
and is not important: judicial decisions are more important than statutes;
adjudication is more important than other modes of lawmaking or conflict
resolution; and adversary litigation is more important than advising,
counseling, planning, drafting, and all the other things lawyers do.
Student objectives become limited: they seek to learn enough doctrine to
spot issues on the written essay exams used in law school. The success, in
both medicine and law, of inculcating the culture of a profession, comes at
some cost in terms of a narrowed outlook.
B. Lack of a Systemic View
Second, both legal and medical education lack a larger perspective, a
systemic view. The emphasis in medical school is retrospective diagnosis
of the patient's ailment, which leads to selection of treatment alterna-
tives. The focus is individual and curative, not social and preventive.
When ethical issues arise, they are the individual dilemmas of micro-
ethics (i.e., which of two or more conflicting values should be served in
individual doctor-patient situations). The broader issues of macroethics-
who gets medical services of what quality and who does not, who pays for
health care, and how the health care system might be improved-receive
as little attention as preventive medicine, perhaps one percent of the
medical curriculum.
Law school similarly focuses on the discrete controversy: a set of past
events that create a problem for a lawyer who is representing a client.
Usually the setting is one in which litigation is already underway. The
effect of legal rules on behavior, the routine operation of legal institu-
tions, the issues of macroethics such as who gets legal services and who
does not, and the like, are largely ignored. Legal scholarship primarily
addresses other questions. Law schools are aptly named. They are not
' See, e.g., Eichna, Medical-School Education, 1975-1979, 303 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 727
(1980); and Weissmann, Are We Reverting to the Pre-Flexner Era?, HOSPITAL PRACTICE, March
1976, at 35.
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justice schools or lawyering schools, but schools primarily devoted to the
study of law-analysis and argumentative use of existing legal doctrine.
C. Retreat into Professional Role
The third common failing is the narrow view medical schools and law
schools take of the professional role. The medical school portrays the
doctor as a scientist of disease, detached and objective, who does what is
best for patients who are generally viewed as helpless, dependent, and
incapable of making decisions for themselves. This model, even after the
recent incursions of informed-consent ideas, is highly paternalistic; its
absorption with the scientific and technical neglects the social and
psychological aspects of health. Many health problems stem from envi-
ronmental or behavioral factors such as diet, exercise, smoking, and the
like-which often are far more important than any treatment a doctor
can prescribe. In order to get information from patients and persuade
them to follow prescribed treatments, doctors must possess good inter-
personal and rhetorical skills. Much of the assembly-line processing of
patients fails to elicit relevant information or neglects psychological
difficulties that are more significant than physical symptoms.' 0 Even
though much in medicine is cut-and-dried, in the sense that particular
physical symptoms lead to specific treatments (more so than legal
matters in which business judgments, social values, and the like are
usually implicated), many medical judgments must be made on the basis
of incomplete information. Medical practice, clearly, is and should be
broader than the more restricted model emphasized by the standard
curriculum.
The law student also is taught the convenience and comfort of a
restricted legal role which takes the adversary system for granted, puts
the lawyer in the position of giving technical support for the client's
interest, and views justice not in substantive terms but as the outcome of
existing processes.
D. Disinterestedness
Fourth, medical school and law school pretend that the exposure to
professional school will convert students to a disinterested frame of
mind-they will act as professionals in the interest of patients, clients,
"0 See, e.g., Hulka, Communication, Compliance and Concordance Between Physicians
and Patients with Prescribed Medications, 66 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 847 (1976) (over 30% of
patients fail to follow prescribed treatment, with failures in physician communication a
principal factor); M. DIMATTEO AND H. FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MEDICINE 106 (1982)
(failure to elicit relevant information in patient interviews); S. Cohen-Cole, On Teaching
the New (and Old) Psychobiology, NEw BIOLOGY AND MEDICAL EDUCATION 133-34 (Friedman
and Purcell eds. 1983) (physicians more likely to overlook significant emotional disorders
than physical symptoms).
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and the public rather than in their own interests. Professional behavior
within and after school suggests that no such mass conversions take place;
doctors and lawyers, like most groups, tend to view the world from their
own vantage points and most decisions are skewed in favor of self-
interest. The elaborate professional effort to deny consumers new deliv-
ery forms, limit the information they receive, repress competition from
within and without, and structure fee and payment arrangements so that
professional interests are served-all belie the assumption of disinterest-
edness.
A growing body of studies, both of the medical and legal marketplace,
and of the behavior of doctors, support this position. Physicians, for
example, are influenced by the availability of compensation in making
decisions as to the tests and procedures that will be employed. Now that
physicians have become owners and investors in profit-making health
care businesses, it is even more likely that their judgments will be
influenced consciously or unconsciously by self-interest.I
III. WHY IS PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION So RESISTANT TO CHANGE?
Flexner's 1910 report on medical education and the subsequent reports
of Reed and Redlich on legal education contain many of these criticisms.12
They are echoed again in more recent reports such as those of Derek Bok
on both legal and medical education13 and that of the GPEP report on
physicians for the twenty-first century.1 4 Why are repeated efforts at
reform and change seemingly so destined for failure?
One obvious response is that, despite faults, professional education in
medicine and law has been enormously successful. The programs have
attracted able people who have had remarkably successful careers.
Although critics and reformers can identify failings and opportunities for
improvement, the forces of change have been undermined by the success
" See Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 963
(1980); and Relman, The Future ofMedical Practice, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer 1983 at 5. The
conflict of interest in fee-for-service practice between the professional and the consumer of
professional services is unavoidable, but Relman argues that a variety of factors (e.g., less
visibility of the conflict to the consumer; and unutilized professional time resulting from an
increased supply of physicians) make the ownership arrangements more dangerous.
" A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1910); A.Z. REED,
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921); J. REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE
CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS (1914).
" Bok, President's Report, Harvard University (1983) [hereinafter cited as President's
Report]; Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 570
(1983), reprinted from HARVARD MAGAZINE 38-45, 70-71 (May-June 1983).
4 Assoc. OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, Physicians for the Twenty-First Century, Report
of the Panel on the General Professional Education of the Physician and College Preparation
for Medicine (1984) [GPEP Report].
(Vol. 34:349
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of medical and law graduates and the public acceptance of present
educational patterns.
Another obvious answer, especially relevant to law, is limited re-
sources. Law schools are relatively small institutions with limited
budgets and are highly dependent on tuition revenue (or state funding in
the case of public schools). Except in crisis situations, educational change
tends to come about gradually as new personnel and curriculum innova-
tions are added to the existing program. But the limited resource
argument is not really applicable to medical schools. The current unwill-
ingness of public bodies to continue subsidization of medical education as
part of research or patient-care may result in a funding crisis which will
force change. At any rate, over a long enough period, the limited resource
argument cannot be used as an excuse in either field.
A more important reason for resistance to change lies in faculty
incentives and rewards. Here the argument takes a different form in the
two fields. Medical schools are highly dependent on research funds and
payments for patient care. The central concern of nearly all faculty is in
these areas, not the teaching of medical students. In a very real sense, the
M.D. medical program is a marginal activity in today's academic health
center in which specialized research, patient care, and graduate medical
education have a higher priority. For the scientific faculty, the important
rewards are found in scientific advances and the adulation of peers in the
scientific community; for the clinical faculty, patient care combines
professional obligation and material reward.
In this setting, the loyalties of medical faculty are elsewhere-not to
the medical curriculum or the teaching of students. Substantial change
will have to rest on a reordering of these priorities. But how will that
come about? Exhortation is easy, but a real shift in priorities will require
a restructuring of incentives and rewards. Perhaps, as suggested by
Rosemary Stevens, medical education will have to provide separate
institutional support for the M.D. program through a distinct medical
college with its own teaching faculty and budget.15
In law there is some diversion of attention towards scholarship directed
at specialized peers and to provision of legal services through consulting
arrangements with law firms. But teaching is highly valued by law
faculty as well as by deans and students. The problem in law stems from
the traditional conception of the casebook-centered class and the self-
perpetuation of a faculty selected because they were good at parsing
cases.
15 Paper delivered by Rosemary Stevens, Medical Education in America: Continuing
Themes (Vanderbilt Health Policy Symposium, May 4, 1985), reprinted in HEALTH AFFAIDS,
Fall 1986.
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There is probably more agreement concerning desirable changes in
legal education than is generally acknowledged.16 Most legal educators
agree that legal education would be better if it were more diverse in
method and content, more highly structured, and more intellectually
demanding. Practice skills should be taught and integrated with social
research on the behavior of legal officials and institutions. Theoretical
underpinnings from other disciplines should be effectively integrated
with legal education.
To do all of this, however, would require law faculties to do what
medical schools did many years ago-diversify faculties by hiring indi-
viduals whose skills and interests lay in practice contexts, social re-
search, and related disciplines.17 The character of law faculties would
change, along with the curriculum. There would be more disunity and
conflict, diverse interests, and a much greater variety of scholarly
interests and methods. Law schools would be more interesting, but
gatherings in the faculty lounge would be less comfortable, convenient,
and clubby.
A final factor inhibits change in both law and medicine. Professional
curricula were molded at the turn of the century in order to fit what was
then viewed as the characteristic problem of the two callings.18 In law
that meant teaching law students how to "think like lawyers," an
amorphous phrase encompassing an aggregation of knowledge, skills,
and attitudes that deal with identifying legal issues in human situations,
marshalling the evidence and arguments on all sides, and deciding on a
solution appropriate to the problem. The medical counterpart-"thinking
like doctors"-views "disease [as] a scientific phenomenon consisting of
deviations from a biomedical norm."' The doctor's job is to diagnose the
ailment and then to cure it or at least ameliorate its effect by choosing a
mode of treatment. As a prominent medical teacher has stated: "medicine
[thus viewed] is a very narrow discipline."20 If humanism is wrung out
and medicine is reduced to diagnostic scientism, it is a narrow discipline.
These limited conceptions of the principal task, both in law and medicine,
continue to influence the structure and content of professional education.
Like the old forms of action in English common-law pleading, they rule us
from their grave.
IC The degree of agreement is demonstrated by the papers of five writers who each
addressed the law curriculum at the 1982 annual meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools. See The Law Curriculum in the 1980s, 32 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 315 passim (1982).
"7 This point has been made very forcefully by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Curriculum
Structure and Faculty Structure, 35 J. OF LEGAL Etic. 326 (1985)_
"s This paragraph draws heavily on Derek Bok's report on medical education, see
President's Report, supra note 13, at 9-10.
19 Id., at 9.
20 Address by Donald Selden, 1981 Presidential Address to the Association of American
Physicians, quoted in President's Report, supra note 13, at 9.
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It is fashionable when professionals get together to emphasize the
public-interest orientation of the profession. Physicians talk about their
dedication to public health, the social needs for improved primary-care
service, and problems in the social distribution of medical services.
Lawyers talk in similar terms about the advancement of justice and the
legal needs of the poor. But professional behavior in each field is largely
inconsistent with this moral exhortation. Professionals in both fields give
the highest status to specialized professional work, not to the human
contact and interpersonal aspects of meeting the routine problems of
ordinary people.21 These status judgments are reinforced by the reward
systems in both medicine and law. For example, third party reimburse-
ment schemes in medicine reward new technological procedures but
discourage expenditure of effort on counseling patients.22 It is very
difficult to change these patterns because they are part of the profession's
structure of values and prestige. Convincing statements of how current
values and practices might be changed are rare.
IV. WHAT CAN LEGAL EDUCATION LEARN FROM MEDICAL EDUCATION?
Two aspects of professional medical education have direct relevance to
legal education. First is the demonstration that a structured exposure to
learning in professional settings can enliven and improve professional
education. The scale and sophistication of clinical education in medicine
provides models for the organization and evaluation of clinical experi-
ences that can generate insights of great utility to legal clinicians. The
absence in legal education of an institution analogous to that of the
teaching hospital complicates any transfer of the medical experience to
legal education. Nevertheless, the care and sophistication that has
accompanied the organization and evaluation of clinical education in
medicine make the medical experience a valuable source of insights and
models.
A second lession of medical education relates to the diversity and
research orientation of the medical school complex. If the American law
school is going to contribute a larger quantum of empirical knowledge
and innovative theory to the understanding of law and legal institutions,
it will need to enlarge and broaden its research interests and methods.
The careful analysis of legal doctrine in particular fields, culminating in
a traditional law review article, has continuing value, but it should
become a smaller portion of the total research product of legal scholars.
Empirical study of legal rules and legal institutions and theoretical
analysis of underlying value choices must be given more emphasis. This
will become possible only if law faculties become more diverse in
21 See Abbott, Status and Status Strain in the Professions, 86 AM. J. oF Soc. 819 (1981).
22 See Relman, supra note 11, at 969.
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training, interest, and disciplinary focus. As this happens, law faculties,
like current medical faculties, will become less cohesive, but the in-
creased diversity will produce large dividends.
V. WHAT CAN MEDICAL EDUCATION LEARN FROM LEGAL EDUCATION?
What can medical education learn from legal education? The question
presupposes that a medical faculty, under the pressure of declining
resources, wants to involve itself more deeply in curriculum change and
teaching activities.
First, law schools have demonstrated that critical thinking can be
taught effectively and efficiently in large classes. The dialectical tech-
nique used in first-year law classrooms (usually referred to as the socratic
method) is a problem-solving exploration that cultivates critical think-
ing. It is an exciting intellectual experience for students, one that
stretches their minds, encourages an attitude of skeptical inquiry, and
requires them to assume a professional role and to solve professional
problems. Although the technique is most effective and pleasant in
classes of twenty to forty students, it can be employed effectively in
groups of seventy-five to one hundred fifty students. Like most every-
thing else in legal education, it is a relatively inexpensive teaching
technique.
Use of this technique in the initial years of medical school, in tandem
with lectures and laboratory exercises, would require students to take a
more scientific and active approach to diagnosing medical situations and
devising remedial strategies. In the medical school context, the "cases" on
which discussion would focus would probably resemble the more elabo-
rate case histories employed in business school teaching. Memorization of
scientific detail would be downplayed; finding and using scientific infor-
mation in a disciplined fashion would be encouraged.
Since a case or problem technique places greater pressures on students,
especially if they are called upon to state their own views before their
colleagues, its introduction would require considerable preparation and
institutional support. This pedagogy also requires on the part of teachers
special skills and more effort than are needed for the use of lecture
techniques. But the use of dialectical methods, in the hands of skilled
teachers who are sensitive to student reactions and do not create too
much anxiety, can be highly effective as well as efficient.
Second, legal education's reduced emphasis on clinical education and
absence of formal, prescribed modes of apprenticeship training raise
questions that medical educators should consider. Legal education errs in
giving too little exposure to clinical experience: Does medical education
err at the other extreme by devoting too much time to routine patient
care narrowly oriented to body organs rather than to the whole being of
the patient? There are possibilities here both for improving medical
education and reducing its length and cost.
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Educational improvements are likely to flow from more effective
integration of intellectual and practical activity; use of simulation
techniques to provide all students with a controlled and uniform intro-
duction to certain professional skills; use of interactive computer-assisted
instruction to emphasize the knowledge and analytical aspects of profes-
sional care; and greater structure, feedback, and individualization of
teaching in connection with patient-care activities.
Dramatic economies might be achieved by limiting the length and
formality of the specialized programs of graduate medical education. Do
all physicians need specialized training? Do the specialized tracks need to
be as long as at present? The cost of medical care is probably affected as
much by the length of professional training as by any other factor. The
law model is one in which apprenticeship costs are largely absorbed
initially by legal employers (and ultimately by their clients). Would a
similar model be appropriate in at least some areas of medical special-
ization? The critical question is whether apprenticeships can be created
that provide learning experiences of sufficient quality, coverage, and
uniformity. Monitoring the educational experience from afar is difficult,
and wide variations in quality can be expected in field situations in which
supervisors have responsibilities and interests other than teaching.
Issues of this kind clearly need to be explored in an effort to reduce the
total costs of medical education and ultimately what the consumer pays.
Informed insiders will have to provide answers to these questions. It is
doubtful whether the extreme position of the legal model, with its lack of
any formal structure for apprenticeship training, is appropriate in
medicine. Health is a more easily defined individual concern than justice,
the consequences of error are more visible, and malpractice liability is
omnipresent. A new lawyer's mistake, incurred while learning at the
expense of a client, is tolerated by society, in part because most clients are
fairly well-informed users of legal services. A new doctor's mistake,
however, affecting individual patients, is socially less tolerable. Physi-
cians deal with a much wider range of the population, and most patients
are not informed consumers of medical services. But the increasing
ability of third-party payers to act as surrogates for individual patients in
selecting and supervising new doctors suggests that different conditions
may exist in the years ahead. Measures that place the expense and risk
of apprenticeship training on third-party payers might prove to be better
as well as cheaper.
Finally, the current costs of medical education, as compared to legal
education, raise questions about whether economies are not possible. The
increasing desire of governmental authorities to separate the costs of
medical education from its closely allied activities of medical research
and low-income patient care, places pressure on medical educators to
identify and justify these costs. Medical educators will encounter diffi-
culty in persuading public officials to renew or increase public subsidies
of medical education unless they can demonstrate that public goals, such
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as the long term protection of public health, require annual costs of
$30,000-$50,000 per student per year. The extensive laboratories and
clinical activities of medical education justify costs that are substantially
higher than legal education, but medicine must bear the burden of
showing that present differentials are justifiable.
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